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Motivation and Background
China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform and Main Tenure Types
1 No-reform: no reform in village, forests collectively owned as before;
2 Household private: villages adopted the reform and devolved forests
to households;
3 Household-joint: villages adopted the reform and devolved forests,
where some of these households formed joint-management
4 Village-collective: villages adopted the reform and collectively manage
the forests
This paper examines: Can further devolution trigger collective action
in forest management and benefit member households?
Data sources:
1 Village & household survey in 8 provinces, 2005 and 2010
2 MODIS MCD12Q1 on land cover type classification (500m): 2001-2012







Results: Treatment effect on forest
Table: ATE estimates based on matching
Coef. Std.Err. Obs. (N) Villages (N) R-squared
Forest coverage
Year 0 0.035*** (0.0109) 528 44 0.178
Year 1 0.033** (0.0110) 528 44 0.175
Year 2 0.020* (0.0114) 528 44 0.165
Year 3 0.018* (0.0107) 484 44 0.218
EVI
Year 0 -0.005 (0.0112) 836 44 0.159
Year 1 0.004 (0.0113) 792 44 0.099
Year 2 0.002 (0.0114) 748 44 0.079
Year 3 0.007 (0.0117) 704 44 0.087
Year 4 0.022** (0.0121) 660 44 0.091
Year 5 0.015 (0.0127) 616 44 0.074
Year 6 -0.005 (0.0132) 572 44 0.072
Year 7 0.012 (0.0139) 528 44 0.079
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Results: Treatment effect on household income
Table: ATE estimates based on matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Relative Off-farm Off-farm Farming Forest prod.
income poverty income income (%) income value
Panel A. 2005-2010
Devolution-based collective action 2,326.304* -0.042 2,221.130** 0.045 134.895 436.398*
(1,248.151) (0.074) (975.002) (0.058) (330.702) (238.614)
R-squared 0.181 0.041 0.164 0.167 0.104 0.080
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
Number of household 298 298 298 298 298 298
Panel B. 2000-2010
Devolution-based collective action 1,821.805 -0.024 2,214.822** 0.055 154.677 459.397*
(1,137.009) (0.074) (928.311) (0.056) (382.615) (256.637)
R-squared 0.246 0.091 0.208 0.121 0.088 0.084
Observations 881 881 881 881 881 881
Number of household 298 298 298 298 298 298
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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